

Gangsterism Behaviour and Culture: A Threat to Investment Climate and Economic Security in Industrial Zones

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Abstract

The proliferation of gangsterism in Indonesia's industrial zones has emerged as a serious threat to the investment climate and national economic stability. Informal violence, extortion of logistics, and the monopolisation of distribution channels by mass organisations operating under gangsterism create legal uncertainty, reduce business efficiency, and generate hidden economic costs that negatively affect investor confidence. This study aims to systematically explore the behavioural and cultural characteristics of gangsterism in industrial areas and to examine the social, legal, and economic factors driving its expansion. Employing a descriptive qualitative approach, the research draws on secondary data from academic journals, institutional reports, and legal documents. The findings reveal that gangsterism is not merely a consequence of weak law enforcement but also a product of social inequality, structural unemployment, and the involvement of local political actors in informal power relations. The study further shows that gangsterism disguised as community organisations follows a systematic pattern with the potential to disrupt industrial supply chains and undermine long-term investment certainty. Its original contribution lies in the identification of two forms of industrial gangsterism—informal and formal-political and in mapping their nexus with the degradation of microeconomic security. The study recommends the establishment of an Anti-Gangsterism Task Force in strategic industrial areas as well as the strengthening of regulations and inter-agency coordination to foster a clean, stable, and globally competitive industrial ecosystem.

Keywords: Gangsterism, Industrial Zones, Economic Security, Investment, Mass Organisations,

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Informal Power

INTRODUCTION

As a developing country, Indonesia relies heavily on the industrial sector to accelerate economic growth and achieve sustainable development goals. Industrialisation has been the primary driver of structural transformation from agriculture to manufacturing and services, creating employment opportunities, boosting exports, and enhancing national competitiveness. Afianti et al. (2025) show that the development of industrial infrastructure, when supported by improvements in human resources, significantly fosters industrialisation and strengthens national economic resilience. Similarly, Widodo et al. (2025) emphasise that industrial estates integrated with ports, such as those developed in eastern Indonesia, contribute to sustainable regional economic development by efficiently utilising maritime potential and natural resources. These findings highlight that the industrial sector is not only vital as an engine of national economic growth but also as an instrument for equitable regional development.

Industrial zones in Indonesia, particularly on the island of Java such as Bekasi, Karawang, Batam, and Gresik have played a pivotal role as national production and distribution hubs with significant impacts on employment absorption. These areas have developed into leading industrial clusters that attract both domestic and foreign investment, while also stimulating local economic growth. For instance, Aditya Arifin & Purwanti (2025) found that industrialisation in Cikarang, Bekasi, led to a population surge from around 230,000 in the early 1990s to over 550,000 in 2023, reflecting massive urbanisation driven by industrial job creation. This transformation has shifted local livelihoods from agriculture to manufacturing and services. Furthermore, Afianti et al. (2025) reaffirm that the development of industrial estates significantly contributes to employment absorption, particularly when supported by infrastructure enhancement and human capital development. These findings demonstrate that industrial zones function not only as economic drivers but also as levers of social mobility and structural transformation in employment.

Industrial estates in Indonesia have also become primary destinations for Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), which plays a strategic role in strengthening the trade balance and increasing state revenues. FDI inflows into these industrial zones not only expand production and export capacity but also generate multiplier effects through technology transfer and improved competitiveness of local industries. Per capita GDP and tax ratios have had a significant positive effect on FDI growth in Indonesia between 2018 and 2023, indicating that regions with stronger infrastructure and purchasing power are more attractive to foreign investors (Rachel Pradita et





al., 2024). FDI is crucial for enhancing national productivity and accelerating long-term economic growth, while serving as a key strategy for Indonesia to escape the middle-income trap (Marissa et al., 2025). Thus, optimising industrial estates as FDI hubs is essential for strengthening Indonesia's economic structure to be more competitive and sustainable.

Indonesia requires a reputation as a secure and predictable investment environment, underpinned by legal certainty and business protection, particularly in industrial zones that serve as engines of national growth. The Ministry of Industry has stated that legal uncertainty and gangsterism practices by mass organisations have created substantial informal costs and eroded investor confidence (Adri, 2025). Data from the Association of Industrial Estates (Himpunan Kawasan Industri, HKI) reveal that such practices have caused investment cancellations and capital flight amounting to hundreds of trillions of rupiah (Fauzan, 2025). A concrete example is the potential failure of a major Rp.11.7 trillion investment by BYD in Subang due to pressure and demands from mass organisations seeking involvement in business activities (Hasanah, 2025). This situation demonstrates that, although industrial estates hold strategic potential as manufacturing hubs and sources of employment, they remain vulnerable to various forms of social disruption originating outside the state's formal structures. Such disruptions include coercion, demonstrations, obstruction of access, and sabotage by non-state actors such as informal groups or community organisations, which pose serious threats to stable economic growth.

The phenomenon of gangsterism disguised as community organisations in Indonesian industrial zones reflects complex socio-economic challenges within national production and distribution systems. These practices occur not only at ports or public terminals but have also become entrenched in strategic industrial areas such as Cikarang, Pulogadung, and Tanjung Priok. Forms of gangsterism include extortion of logistics trucks, monopolisation of distribution routes, and illegal "security" practices, all of which burden businesses and reduce supply-chain efficiency. Logistics management in Indonesia—particularly within the Courier, Express, and Parcel (CEP) sector—continues to face significant obstacles, including informal risks in field operations, indicating disruption by non-formal actors (Veronica & Irenita, 2025). Lestari et al. (2025) also highlight that Indonesia's industrial growth continues to be hindered by both structural and non-structural challenges, including social disruptions in production areas. Such phenomena are often perpetuated by connections between gangster groups and local actors, or even tolerance from authorities due to entrenched socio-economic ties. Consequently, addressing gangsterism requires a multidimensional approach combining law enforcement, distribution oversight, and the digital transformation of logistics and industrial security systems.





Gangsterism in Indonesia's industrial zones has become a serious threat to the investment climate, particularly for foreign investors who prioritise social stability and legal certainty. Practices such as illegal levies on logistics, monopolisation of distribution access, and illicit "security" arrangements by non-formal actors generate unofficial costs that burden companies and reduce operational efficiency. Such conditions contribute to declining investor interest in areas perceived as socially insecure. Weaknesses in the legal system and industrial security enforcement further exacerbate the vulnerability of industrial estates to gangsterism infiltration. Operational risks arising from legal disputes or social instability can undermine investor confidence, especially for subsidiaries of multinational corporations.

The rise of gangsterism in industrial zones illustrates its increasing complexity and raises concerns due to involvement in illegal activities such as extortion, distribution route monopolisation, and unrecognised "security" services. Such practices clearly undermine operational efficiency, disrupt logistics distribution, and weaken legal certainty for businesses. The persistence of gangsterism outside formal legal structures not only creates instability within industrial environments but also risks diminishing investor confidence—both domestic and international—in the state's capacity to provide a conducive and sustainable investment climate. Against this backdrop, this study is significant in systematically exploring the behavioural characteristics and cultural construction of gangsterism in industrial zones, including the social factors influencing its development.

This research offers practical contributions through policy recommendations at both national and regional levels, particularly in strengthening security, law enforcement, and the socio-economic empowerment of communities surrounding industrial areas. By employing an empirically grounded approach and in-depth analysis, the study's findings are expected to provide a foundation for reinforcing regulatory frameworks, enhancing stakeholder coordination, and designing effective social intervention models to reduce community dependence on harmful informal activities. In this way, a safe, stable, and investment-friendly industrial environment for long-term growth can be achieved in a more structured and sustainable manner.

METHOD

This study employs a qualitative literature review approach aimed at examining and synthesising previous research findings, legal documents, and relevant theories related to gangsterism behaviour, investment climate, and economic security in industrial zones (Creswell, 2009). Secondary data were collected from national and international scholarly journals, academic books, and credible institutional reports published within the past ten years. Data





analysis was conducted using descriptive analysis techniques, which serve as the fundamental method for systematically interpreting the collected data. Through this process, conclusions are drawn in alignment with the study's central focus.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

According to Wilson (2018), gangsters represent informal actors who frequently fill the void left by the state, while simultaneously reinforcing coercive forms of power legitimised by political structures. Gangsterism is a social phenomenon that refers to behaviours and actions involving the mobilisation of groups accompanied by threats, violence, and illegal control in pursuit of economic, political, or social objectives. From a sociological perspective, gangsterism can be seen as a form of community organisation operating outside legal frameworks yet often linked directly or indirectly to wider social structures.

Community organisations (ORMAS) function as a double-edged sword. Not all ormas engage in gangsterism; some contribute positively to society and the state, while others disrupt public security and order. Legally, community organisations are regulated under Government Regulation in Lieu of Law (PERPPU) of the Republic of Indonesia No. 2/2017, which amends Law No. 17/2013 on Community Organisations. Article 1 of this regulation defines ORMAS as voluntary associations established by citizens on the basis of shared aspirations, needs, and objectives, in order to participate in development in pursuit of the goals of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia, founded on Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution. In this sense, community organisations are meant to provide a legitimate platform for citizens to collectively express interests in line with the constitutional order.

Gangster groups act as perpetrators of violence, using ideology as a mechanism to maintain power through fear and coercion. Gangsterism embodies an ideology of violence, which becomes a tool for legitimising authority. Violence is used to enforce loyalty, preserve hierarchy, and consolidate territorial or economic control. In doing so, gangster groups cultivate fear within communities, discouraging resistance.

The culture of gangsterism today can be categorised into two forms: informal gangsterism and formal gangsterism, the latter being structured, systematised, and often protected by political power. Informal gangsterism refers to sporadic or small-scale groups lacking formal organisation or cultural and political ties, commonly visible in everyday practices such as extortion in traditional markets. In contrast, formal gangsterism is more organised, sometimes registered as community organisations, and operates through social networks, covert security businesses, and paid crowds. Such groups often maintain ties with business actors, political elites,





and even rogue elements within law enforcement. This entrenched form of gangsterism is significantly more dangerous and poses a direct threat to economic sustainability.

From a legal standpoint, gangsterism constitutes a criminal offence encompassing threats, extortion through violence, unlawful seizure of property, and organised crime. Yet law enforcement efforts are frequently hampered by corruption, collusion with authorities, and the lack of adequate evidence due to a prevailing culture of fear that deters victims from reporting. The persistence of gangsterism reflects weaknesses in impartial and equitable law enforcement. Structural inequality arising from state absence in providing welfare further entrenches this culture. Legal inconsistency and transactional justice create opportunities for gangster actors to fill governance voids with coercive power (Wilson, 2018).

Economic and social inequality, coupled with limited access to formal employment and education, further marginalises segments of society. Data from the Central Statistics Agency BPS (2025) show that as of February 2025, unemployment stood at 7.28 million, a decrease of 0.19 million (2.54%) compared with August 2024. The Open Unemployment Rate fell to 4.76%, down by 0.15 percentage points from 4.91% in August 2024. A July 2025 report by the Ministry of Manpower at the INDEF Summit revealed that the 7.28 million unemployed included 1.01 million university graduates, 177,000 diploma holders, 1.62 million vocational graduates, 2.03 million secondary school graduates, and 2.42 million primary and junior secondary school leavers (CNN Indonesia, 2025; Kompas.com, 2025a, 2025b).

Gangsterism thus becomes a shortcut to livelihoods. Inequality provides the social basis for the behaviour and culture of gangsterism (Robison et al., 2007). The involvement of local actors and political elites further perpetuates these practices. Political elites and parties often employ gangster groups as “foot soldiers” for mobilising crowds, controlling voters, and exercising coercion (Tajima & Walsh, 2016). Gangster tactics provide a cost-effective means of sustaining informal violence for political gain. The absence of the state at the micro level, particularly in industrial zones, opens opportunities for gangsterism disguised as non-state actors to offer “alternative security” that substitutes for the role of the state. Many industrial estates are controlled by gangster or informal security networks that operate systematic protection rackets (Bakker, 2018).

Java is the centre of Indonesia’s industrial concentration, playing a strategic role in economic growth. In West Java, industrial zones such as Jababeka in Cikarang, Delta Silicon in Lippo Cikarang, and MM2100 in Cibitung serve as major hubs for manufacturing, automotive, and electronics industries involving thousands of multinational firms. Karawang International Industrial City (KIIC) has become the largest automotive production base, while new





developments such as Subang Smartpolitan are being built as smart city–based industrial zones connected to Patimban Port. In Jakarta and Banten, areas such as Pulo Gadung and Modern Cikande Industrial Estate in Serang serve as centres for chemical, food, and logistics industries. Krakatau Steel Industrial Estate in Cilegon plays a crucial role in the steel sector, integrated with Merak Port. In Central Java, industrial zones include Kawasan Industri Wijayakusuma (KIW) in Semarang and Kendal Industrial Park (KIK), a joint project with Singapore focused on textiles, light metals, and exports. In East Java, growth is concentrated in the Surabaya–Gresik–Mojokerto corridor, with Surabaya Industrial Estate Rungkut (SIER) and Java Integrated Industrial and Ports Estate (JIPE) serving as major hubs for food, electronics, chemicals, and smelting. Collectively, Java accounts for more than 60% of national industrial capacity and is the backbone of Indonesia’s non-oil exports.

Indonesia’s economy grew by 4.87% (y-on-y) in the first quarter of 2025, though it contracted by 0.98% (q-to-q) compared to Q4 2024. Industrial zones remain key drivers of economic activity. BPS (2025a) data show that Java contributed 57.43% to the national gross regional domestic product (GRDP), with growth of 4.99%. The processing industry contributed 19.25% to national GDP in Q1 2025, dominated by automotive, electronics, and petrochemicals. However, despite strong foreign investment interest, critical challenges remain: legal certainty and security. According to Kompas (2025a), investment realisation in Q1 2025 grew by only 24.4%, slowing due to concerns about gangsterism and extortion in industrial estates, which disrupt business stability. These findings suggest that, while industrial zones act as engines of growth, weak law enforcement and pervasive informal violence undermine long-term economic potential.

Gangsterism has become a recurrent threat to investor security in industrial areas. Practices such as illegal levies, intimidation of entrepreneurs, and disruption of logistics by gangster-linked organisations remain widespread, often without effective legal response. An investigative report by Kompas (2025c) highlighted that industries in Bekasi and Karawang face frequent extortion of logistics trucks, with some groups even facilitating wildcat strikes under the guise of labour organisations. One business owner remarked: “Every day, our trucks are stopped by gangster-linked ormas demanding money. If we don’t pay, the goods will not reach their destination.” Such practices create hidden economic costs, including additional security expenses, informal payments, and reduced distribution efficiency due to blockades. These conditions foster negative perceptions of Indonesia’s business environment, leading some foreign investors to delay expansion or relocate to neighbouring countries perceived as more legally stable.

In comparison, Vietnam’s industrial zones have developed rapidly and remain attractive for foreign investment. Although Vietnam is widely regarded as having a relatively clean and



stable investment climate, informal practices and petty extortion still exist, particularly in logistics and distribution (Kompas.com, 2010). While less prevalent than in Indonesia, such issues can still raise operational costs. Overall, however, Vietnam is considered to offer a more stable and investment-friendly business environment than countries facing severe gangsterism.

Beyond investment, gangsterism also directly threatens the economic security of industrial zones. Extortion, intimidation, and sabotage by informal groups disrupt supply chains, delay goods distribution, and cause significant logistical losses. These disruptions have ripple effects, affecting local SMEs dependent on large industries, reducing workers' incomes through lower production levels, and weakening public trust in law enforcement institutions. In the long run, this social tension undermines both industrial resilience and economic stability (Kompas.id, 2025b).

Strategies for Countering the Threat of Gangsterism

Gangsterism is not merely a social phenomenon but also a tangible threat involving violence, extortion, and informal domination that often undermines security, public order, and the investment climate. Many countries have developed anti-gangsterism strategies as systematic efforts to address and eradicate such practices. These strategies combine repressive and preventive approaches through collaboration among state institutions, communities, and the private sector.

The repressive approach represents the most common initial response by states, encompassing law enforcement operations and strict legal actions against mass organisations or gangster groups. Such measures include arrests, investigations, and prosecutions in accordance with existing legislation. Additionally, governments strengthen the capacity of law enforcement agencies to ensure effective action without compromise against illicit practices. However, repression alone is insufficient, as gangsterism is often deeply rooted in social and economic structures.

Preventive measures are equally crucial in anti-gangsterism strategies (Ministry of Religious Affairs, 2025). These focus on empowering communities in areas vulnerable to gangster activity through socio-economic programmes such as cooperatives, skills training, community empowerment, education improvement, and the creation of alternative livelihoods. By providing better economic and social alternatives, communities are less likely to depend on harmful informal practices. Such initiatives also erode the social base and community support that sustain gangster groups.

An effective anti-gangsterism strategy requires synergy and coordination across

stakeholders, including central and local governments, security apparatus, the private sector, and civil society. Holistic and integrated policies can foster an environment conducive to economic growth and investment while safeguarding social stability. Strengthened regulation, transparency, and consistent law enforcement are essential to prevent the re-emergence of gangsterism. Thus, anti-gangsterism strategies should not only emphasise punitive measures but also pursue sustainable socio-economic transformation that tackles the root causes while building systems that guarantee broader community security and welfare.

As the regulator, the government must provide assurances to investors that gangsterism will no longer hinder business activities in Indonesia. Government Regulation No. 58 of 2016 on the Implementation of Law No. 17 of 2013 concerning Mass Organisations, particularly Article 11, requires every mass organisation to possess a notarial deed of establishment containing statutes and by-laws, work programmes, organisational structures, a registered office certificate, a taxpayer identification number, a declaration of non-dispute over leadership, and a commitment to report activities.

Furthermore, Ministry of Home Affairs Regulation No. 57 of 2017 on the Registration and Management of the Mass Organisation Information System reinforces these provisions by requiring all non-legal-entity organisations to obtain a Registration Certificate (SKT) issued by the Ministry. This framework, supported by the Mass Organisation Information System (SIORMAS), enhances state oversight and facilitates justice for organisations that commit violations.

Firm sanctions are necessary against mass organisations engaging in gangsterism. However, in practice, the dissolution or suspension of organisational licences remains highly challenging. More commonly, sanctions are directed at individuals or members rather than the organisation as a whole, allowing many organisations to evade accountability for their members' actions.

In industrial zones, organisational behaviour that undermines the national economy and deters investors represents structured, systematic, and widespread practices that threaten economic stability. Gangsterism in such zones is a security disturbance requiring urgent intervention. The state can establish dedicated anti-gangsterism task forces in strategic industrial areas as part of revitalising industrial security units. Through the Coordinating Ministry for Political, Legal, and Security Affairs, in collaboration with agencies such as the National Police, the Armed Forces, local governments, and civil security forces, comprehensive law enforcement measures can be taken against gangster activity that jeopardises investment. In turn, government incentives in the form of security guarantees—both physical and social—would help foster a stable investment climate, ensuring the continued growth of Indonesia's economy.



CONCLUSION

Gangsterism in Indonesia's industrial zones has evolved into a systemic threat to economic stability, legal certainty, and the national investment climate. This phenomenon manifests in two forms—informal and formal gangsterism—both of which illustrate the nexus between informal violence, political power, and socio-economic inequality. Gangsterism not only disrupts industrial supply chains and generates hidden economic costs but also erodes investor confidence and damages Indonesia's international reputation.

The roots of gangsterism lie in weak law enforcement, the involvement of local actors and political elites, as well as persistently high unemployment and socio-economic disparities. The state is often absent in micro-level economic and social spaces, leaving a vacuum that is filled by non-state actors operating through coercive power dynamics. Unless addressed urgently, gangsterism will hinder the growth of national industries and pose long-term risks to economic security.

Recommendations

1. Establishment of an Anti-Gangsterism Task Force in Industrial Zones
The government should immediately establish an integrated task force involving the Coordinating Ministry for Political, Legal, and Security Affairs, the National Police, the Armed Forces, municipal police, and local governments to address and suppress gangsterism, particularly in strategic industrial areas.
2. Strengthening Regulations and Law Enforcement against Community Organisations Engaged in Gangsterism
Revision or stricter implementation of Government Regulation No. 58 of 2016 and Ministry of Home Affairs Regulation No. 57 of 2017 is required, so that community organisations involved in gangster-related activities can be suspended or dissolved as entities, rather than only sanctioning individual members.
3. Socio-Economic Empowerment Approaches
Community empowerment programmes around industrial estates should be developed through skills training, job creation, local cooperatives, and vocational education to reduce dependency on informal gangster-related activities.
4. Investment Incentives Linked to Security Guarantees
Fiscal and non-fiscal incentives should be granted to investors operating in industrial zones, accompanied by comprehensive state guarantees of security, including protection against extortion, logistical disruptions, and distribution sabotage.





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