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Sports Policy as an Instrument of Soft Power: A Comparative Study of Indonesia and China

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Abstract

Since 2015, Indonesia's sports policy has been oriented toward long-term development, as formulated in the Grand Design of National Sports (Desain Besar Olahraga Nasional, DBON) 2021–2045. This framework acquired legal legitimacy through Presidential Regulation No. 86 of 2021 and was further reinforced by Law No. 11 of 2022 on Sports (Republik Indonesia, 2021). China, meanwhile, positions sport, particularly its national fitness programme, as an integral component of its public health and national development strategies. This commitment is embodied in the National Fitness Plan issued by the State Council (for the periods 2016–2020 and 2021–2025), as well as in the national agenda of becoming a sports powerhouse as set out in the 14th Five-Year Plan (State Council of the People's Republic of China, 2021). The fundamental difference between the two countries lies in their policy orientation. China emphasises the attainment of quantitative, infrastructure-based targets, for example through the concept of 15-minute access and the construction of thousands of sports parks to expand the coverage of public services. Indonesia, in contrast, prioritises a consolidated multi-level governance model involving the central government, regional governments, and the private sector. This approach is operationalised through the DBON and its regional counterpart (DBOD), supported by multi-source financing

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instruments, including the State Budget (APBN), Regional Budgets (APBD), the Special Allocation Fund (DAK), and Public Service Agencies (BLU) (Kemenko PMK, 2023).

Keywords: DBON; National Fitness Plan; Sports policy.

INTRODUCTION

Sport has become a strategic instrument of national development in both Indonesia and China. Since 2015, Indonesia has directed its sports policy through the Grand Design of National Sports (DBON) 2021–2045, which was enacted by Presidential Regulation No. 86 of 2021 and reinforced by Law No. 11 of 2022 on Sports (Republik Indonesia, 2021). The DBON serves as a long-term roadmap for enhancing national competitiveness through sport, emphasising integration among the central government, regional governments, the private sector, and the wider community. This approach affirms that sport is regarded not merely as a recreational activity but also as part of the strategy for human resource development and public health. The approach adopted by Indonesia through the DBON makes clear that sport is no longer viewed solely as recreation or entertainment, but rather as an integral component of the national human resource development strategy. Sport is positioned as a medium for improving the physical, mental, and social well-being of society, while simultaneously serving as a means of strengthening national identity and global competitiveness. Accordingly, Indonesia's sports policy is oriented toward multidimensional objectives encompassing public health, education, the economy, and international diplomacy. Within this framework, sport functions as a development instrument that cuts across sectors and levels of government. This indicates that sports policy in Indonesia is not oriented exclusively toward athletic achievement, but is also directed at supporting a broader national development agenda, including improving citizens' quality of life, strengthening social cohesion, and creating new economic opportunities through the sports industry. In other words, the DBON positions sport as a catalyst for national development with long-term strategic relevance.

In contrast, China's policy orientation emphasises sport not merely as physical activity but also as an instrument for improving public health, strengthening social cohesion, and fostering economic growth driven by the sports industry. This policy has been implemented through the National Fitness Plan issued by the State Council for the period 2016–2020 and continued for 2021–2025 (Beijing Municipal Administration of Traditional Chinese Medicine, 2022; State Council of the People's Republic of China, 2021). The programme is designed to broaden public access to

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sports facilities through the concept of 15-minute access, meaning that every citizen should be able to reach a sports facility within a short distance of their place of residence. In addition, the Chinese government has committed to building more than 2,000 sports parks as part of its efforts to provide inclusive public spaces that support healthy lifestyles. Furthermore, China's sports policy is directed toward developing the sports industry as a strategic sector of the national economy, with a target value of 5 trillion yuan by 2025 (Aspen Institute Project Play, 2025). This ambition is reinforced by the 14th Five-Year Plan, in which China affirms its determination to become a global sports powerhouse (State Council of the People's Republic of China, 2021). To achieve this goal, the government has invested heavily in sports infrastructure, expanded a tiered competition system extending from the local to the international level, and integrated sport into formal education. Consequently, China's sports policy is oriented not only toward increasing public participation but also toward creating a comprehensive and sustainable sports ecosystem that contributes directly to national development.

The difference in sports policy orientation between Indonesia and China is particularly striking when viewed in terms of the principal focus of each country. China concentrates on achieving quantitative targets grounded in infrastructure development and the expansion of public service coverage. This is reflected in the National Fitness Plan, which emphasises measurable indicators such as the concept of 15-minute access and the construction of thousands of sports parks as venues for public participation (State Council of the People's Republic of China, 2021). This approach demonstrates that China prioritises physical provision and accessibility as benchmarks of sports policy success, while positioning sport as an integral part of a large-scale and measurable national development strategy.

Indonesia, by contrast, through the Grand Design of National Sports (DBON), places greater emphasis on institutional consolidation and on strengthening the governance of multi-source financing, including the APBN, APBD, DAK, and BLU (Republik Indonesia, 2021). This focus underscores that Indonesia's policy orientation is not confined to physical development but seeks to create a sustainable sports ecosystem through synergy among the central government, regional governments, and the private sector. A relevant case can be observed in bilateral cooperation between Indonesia and China, such as the 2025 meeting between Indonesia's Minister of Youth and Sports and the Ambassador of the People's Republic of China aimed at strengthening collaboration in the sports sector (Lewokeda, 2025). In addition, the National Olympic Committee of Indonesia (NOC Indonesia) has highlighted China's success in building sporting excellence through a tiered competition system and the integration of sports education, which offers

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important lessons for Indonesia (NOC Indonesia, 2023). Thus, the core issue in this policy comparison lies in the difference in orientation: China prioritises the expansion of infrastructure and service access, whereas Indonesia seeks to strengthen governance and financing mechanisms as the foundation for long-term sports development.

The sports policy landscapes of Indonesia and China reveal considerable differences in orientation, yet at the same time they display potential complementarities. Indonesia focuses its efforts on building institutional foundations and strengthening sustainable sports governance, with the aim of creating an ecosystem capable of supporting public participation while improving the quality of sports management across levels of government. China, on the other hand, places greater emphasis on achieving physical and quantitative targets, including the development of large-scale sports infrastructure and the growth of the sports industry as a driver of national economic development.

A comparative study of these two policy approaches is important because it can provide deeper insight into how sport functions as an instrument of multidimensional development. Sport not only contributes to improving public health but also serves as a means of strengthening international achievement and expanding cultural diplomacy between nations. Therefore, an analysis of Indonesian and Chinese sports policy holds considerable academic relevance as well as tangible practical implications, particularly for formulating sports strategies at the national and regional levels that are more responsive to global challenges and societal needs.

OVERVIEW OF SOFT POWER AND SPORTS DIPLOMACY

The concept of soft power was introduced by Nye (1990) to describe a form of power that rests on the ability to shape the preferences of others through attraction rather than coercion or payment. Nye (2004, 2008) identifies three primary sources of a state's soft power: its culture, where it is attractive to others; its political values, where it lives up to them at home and abroad; and its foreign policies, where they are seen as legitimate and as having moral authority. Soft power is therefore not simply possessed but must be generated, communicated, and accepted by foreign audiences, which makes public diplomacy, the effort to communicate with and attract publics in other countries, a central mechanism for converting resources into influence (Nye, 2008).

Sport occupies a distinctive place in this framework. It is culturally resonant, globally mediated, and capable of reaching audiences that conventional diplomacy cannot. Grix and Lee (2013) argue that emerging states in particular have turned to sports mega-events to showcase

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their modernity, signal their arrival as global actors, and improve their international image. Building on this, Grix and Brannagan (2016) conceptualise several mechanisms through which states seek soft power via sport, including national image and branding, the showcasing of national achievements, tourism and trade, and diplomacy. At the same time, sport can backfire: heightened international visibility may expose a state to criticism and produce "soft disempowerment" when its practices are judged negatively by global audiences (Brannagan & Giulianotti, 2015).

Sports diplomacy refers to the deliberate use of sport, athletes, events, and sporting cooperation to advance diplomatic objectives and to build relationships between states and peoples (Murray, 2018). It encompasses bilateral sports cooperation agreements, athlete and coach exchanges, the hosting of international competitions, and the international promotion of traditional or national sports. Together, soft power and sports diplomacy provide the analytical lens through which this study reads the sports policies of Indonesia and China, not only in terms of their domestic objectives but also in terms of the resources they create for national image, cultural attraction, and international partnership.

METHODS

This study employs a qualitative comparative approach to compare how Indonesia and China utilise sports policy as an instrument of soft power. Data were obtained from a range of policy documents and related literature and were analysed through the stages of data condensation, data display, and conclusion drawing. The validity of the findings was ensured through source and theoretical triangulation, with the analytical framework grounded in Joseph S. Nye's theory of Soft Power and the concept of sports diplomacy.

COMPARISON OF POLICY SECTORS

The fundamental differences in sports policy orientation between Indonesia and China reflect contrasting yet complementary approaches, which makes them relevant for systematic analysis along the following strategic dimensions:

1. Indonesia establishes the DBON as a "guideline" for central and regional governments, sports organisations, business and industry, academia, the media, and the public, thereby positioning stakeholder coordination as the principal policy instrument.
2. Indonesia uses a combination of participation targets (e.g., a 40% target by 2024 in the initial phase) and development indicators (e.g., the Sport Development Index [Indeks

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Pembangunan Olahraga, IPO] regulated by a Ministerial Regulation of the Minister of Youth and Sports) as the basis for monitoring, although reported participation levels still vary (e.g., 26.3% in one of the ministry's strategic plan documents).

3. China emphasises the provision of public fitness services and infrastructure using quantitative measures (e.g., 2,000+ sports parks/fitness centres/stadiums and facility coverage within a 15-minute walk).
4. China also sets participation/activity targets (e.g., 38.5% of the population "regularly participating in physical exercise" by 2025) and reports an upward trend in participation (e.g., from 33.9% in 2014 to 37.2% in 2021 according to survey data).
5. On the economic side, Indonesia links sport to a "sport-based economy" and encourages financing by business entities and the public (including through the Sports Fund and Business Management Agency [LPDUK] as a BLU), whereas China explicitly links its mass fitness policy to a target value for the sports industry (e.g., 5 trillion yuan).

The following table summarises the differences between Indonesian and Chinese policy approaches across the dimensions that most frequently drive implementation (framework, governance, financing, schools, community sport, industry, and monitoring/targets).

Table 1. Comparison of Sports Policy Approaches in Indonesia and China

Sector	Indonesia	China
Legal and strategic framework	The DBON was enacted through Presidential Regulation No. 86/2021 and sets out a vision and mission, principles, goals/objectives, policies/strategies, and a roadmap (Republik Indonesia, 2021). Law No. 11/2022 serves as the legal umbrella covering sports funding and the sports industry, as well as the scope of educational sport, community	The National Fitness Plan/Program constitutes the policy framework for mass fitness (e.g., 2016–2020 and 2021–2025) issued by the State Council (Li et al., 2016). This direction is further supported by the "Healthy China 2030" strategy and the goal of becoming a "sports powerhouse" under the 14th Five-Year Plan (Zhang et al., 2022).

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	sport, and elite sport (Republik Indonesia, 2022).	
Governance model	The DBON is positioned as a coordination guideline for central and regional governments as well as non-state stakeholders (business/industry, academia, the media, and the public) (Republik Indonesia, 2021). The implementation model also cascades the national framework to the regional level through the DBOD/DOD and central–regional oversight (e.g., coordination related to the DAK) (Kemenko PMK, 2023).	Governance is highly centralised and based on national planning, with an emphasis on centralised Party leadership in national planning documents (Center for Security and Emerging Technology, 2021). Implementation aims at the equitable distribution of fitness services through public service provision, the mobilisation of central and local governments, and "social participation" (Guan & Wang, 2025).
Funding and infrastructure	The DBON Presidential Regulation stipulates that funding is sourced from the APBN, provincial/district/municipal APBD, and other lawful, non-binding sources (Republik Indonesia, 2021). Financing instruments also include the DAK and efforts to manage commercial revenue through the LPDUK (a BLU), which manages funds from sponsorship, broadcasting rights, and promotion (Kemenpora, 2025).	Infrastructure targets are defined quantitatively in mass fitness policy, including "full coverage" of facilities within a 15-minute walk and the construction/expansion of 2,000+ sports parks/fitness centres/public stadiums (State Council of the People's Republic of China, 2021). The national planning document also mandates the construction/renovation/expansion of approximately 1,000 sports parks and prioritises central fiscal funds for major projects (Center for Security and Emerging Technology, 2021).

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School and youth sport	DBON implementation is stated to begin in schools through the educational sport scheme and involves the strategic roles of the ministries of education and religious affairs (Kemenko PMK, 2023). There are directives to update the curriculum of Sports Schools (SKO) and to develop National Talent Management (MTN) based on a student database (Majid, 2024).	The policy aims to strengthen physical education and daily activity time, including ensuring one hour of physical activity per day (on/off campus) and youth fitness programmes to address myopia/obesity (State Council of the People's Republic of China, 2021). The national planning document also guarantees physical education classes and extracurricular training time, as well as monitoring/intervention with a focus on young people (Center for Security and Emerging Technology, 2021).
Community sport and mass fitness	The DBON includes community sport as one of its pillars, and the 40% participation target for 2024 is described as an increase from a participation level of around 30% (Kemenko PMK, 2023). The ministry's strategic plan reports community participation of 26.3% as a baseline, indicating the need to accelerate the cultivation of a sporting culture (Kemenpora, 2025).	The National Fitness Plan emphasises access to mass fitness through "15-minute fitness circles" and the expansion of community fitness organisations, including policies making public facilities cheaper or free of charge (Zhou, 2025). Access targets also include full facility coverage at the county/town/village/community level within a 15-minute walk (State Council of the People's Republic of China, 2021).
Links to the sports industry	Indonesia links the DBON to the goal of advancing a sport-based national economy and recognises business/industry as policy	The policy explicitly targets the value of the sports industry (e.g., a "sports industry" worth 5 trillion yuan) and promotes integration

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	stakeholders (Kemenko PMK, 2023). Institutional instruments such as the LPDUK manage revenue and support events and the development of sports businesses, and the strategic plan records the aggregate value of the sports economy and the position of sports equipment exports (Kemenpora, 2025).	with manufacturing and modern services, as well as sport–tourism convergence (State Council of the People's Republic of China, 2021). Policy documents and the literature also emphasise sports consumption and industrial development as principal objectives (Yu, 2024).
Monitoring and targets	Indonesia has performance targets for sporting achievement (e.g., Asian Games/Olympic ranking targets in the DBON) and activity targets for the school-age population (e.g., 69.06% having engaged in sport in the past week as a target) (Kemenpora, 2025). The indicator framework also incorporates the IPO, regulated by Ministerial Regulation, as a measure of sports development (Kemenpora, 2025).	China sets participation targets (e.g., 38.5% regular exercise by 2025) and reports improvements in participation indicators and in the attainment of national fitness standards over the survey period (Guan & Wang, 2025). Several academic evaluations have also criticised the 2016–2020 policy for lacking specific health targets and for the absence of a surveillance system at various levels of implementation (Li et al., 2016).

DISCUSSION

Read through the lens of soft power, the comparison reveals two distinct logics of sports policy. China follows a logic of measurable provision: it defines success through quantified access standards, facility counts, participation rates, and industry value, and it mobilises a highly centralised planning system to deliver them. Indonesia follows a logic of institutional consolidation: it defines success through the alignment of many actors, levels of government, and funding sources behind a shared long-term design. These logics produce different soft power resources and face different constraints.

China's approach illustrates how domestic sports policy can be converted into external

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influence. The 15-minute fitness circles, thousands of sports parks, and rising participation rates are first and foremost public health measures, yet they also furnish a narrative of a modern, healthy, and well-governed nation that can be communicated abroad. The goal of becoming a sports powerhouse (Center for Security and Emerging Technology, 2021) and the explicit promotion of traditional sports such as Fitness Qigong to international audiences (Beijing Municipal Administration of Traditional Chinese Medicine, 2022) correspond closely to the showcasing and national branding mechanisms identified in the literature (Grix & Brannagan, 2016), and to the broader pattern in which emerging states use sport to signal their modernity and global status (Grix & Lee, 2013). The scale of the sports industry target adds an economic dimension to this attraction through trade, investment, and sport–tourism integration (State Council of the People's Republic of China, 2021). At the same time, visibility invites scrutiny (Brannagan & Giulianotti, 2015): academic evaluations have criticised the 2016–2020 plan for lacking specific health targets and a multi-level surveillance system (Li et al., 2016), indicating that quantitative outputs do not automatically translate into credible outcomes, and that credibility is itself a condition for durable soft power.

Indonesia, for its part, possesses substantial soft power resources in sport. Its cultural assets include traditional sports such as pencak silat, which UNESCO inscribed on the Representative List of the Intangible Cultural Heritage of Humanity in 2019 (UNESCO, 2019), and the country has experience hosting multi-sport events, including the 2018 Asian Games. The DBON includes international diplomacy among its objectives and sets performance targets for Asian Games and Olympic rankings (Kemenpora, 2025), while bilateral initiatives such as the 2025 youth and sports cooperation discussions with China show that sports diplomacy is already practised (Lewokeda, 2025). However, Indonesia's mechanisms for converting these resources into sustained attraction are less developed. Community participation remains low and variable, implementing regulations and regional delivery remain incomplete, and monitoring has yet to be consistently aligned across central and regional plans (Kemenko PMK, 2023; Kemenpora, 2025). Since soft power depends not only on resources but also on the credibility of a state's domestic performance (Nye, 2008), a sports policy that is well designed on paper but unevenly delivered limits the narrative Indonesia can project internationally.

The two approaches are therefore complementary rather than simply opposed. China's experience demonstrates the value of measurable access standards and of explicitly linking domestic fitness policy to industry and international promotion, whereas Indonesia's experience demonstrates the value of multi-stakeholder coordination and diversified financing. Table 2

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summarises how the sports policies of the two countries can be read through the main sources and mechanisms of soft power; the implications for Indonesia are elaborated in the following section.

Table 2. Sports Policy of Indonesia and China through the Lens of Soft Power

Soft Power Dimension	Indonesia	China
Culture (cultural attraction)	Traditional sports such as pencak silat, recognised by UNESCO (UNESCO, 2019); potential not yet systematically linked to sports policy.	Explicit international promotion of traditional sports such as Fitness Qigong (Beijing Municipal Administration of Traditional Chinese Medicine, 2022).
Political values and domestic performance	Participatory, multi-stakeholder governance, but uneven delivery and low participation weaken credibility (Kemenpora, 2025).	Measurable delivery projects an image of an effective state; criticised for weak health targets and surveillance (Li et al., 2016).
Sports diplomacy and foreign policy	Bilateral sports cooperation (e.g., with China) and Olympic ranking targets (Kemenpora, 2025; Lewokeda, 2025).	"Sports powerhouse" goal as part of national strategy (Center for Security and Emerging Technology, 2021).
Showcasing and national branding	Experience hosting multi-sport events such as the 2018 Asian Games; branding not yet integrated with the DBON.	Large-scale infrastructure and fitness achievements communicated as markers of modernisation (Grix & Brannagan, 2016; Grix & Lee, 2013).
Economic attraction (industry, trade, tourism)	Emerging sports economy and LPDUK blended financing (Kemenpora, 2025).	5 trillion yuan sports industry target and sport–tourism integration (Aspen Institute Project Play, 2025; State Council of the People's Republic of China, 2021).

IMPLICATIONS FOR INDONESIA

First, Indonesia can draw lessons from China's approach of making access to fitness services a highly "measurable" policy outcome, for instance through facility coverage standards within a 15-minute radius and large-scale facility construction targets, as Chinese policy

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emphasises “15-minute fitness circles” and facility coverage within a 15-minute walk (Zhou, 2025). Nevertheless, any such adaptation must take into account Indonesia’s financing and governance instruments, which place greater emphasis on the allocation of funding sources across the APBN/APBD/DAK and on the involvement of business entities and the public, as stipulated in the DBON Presidential Regulation and Law No. 11/2022 (Republik Indonesia, 2021).

Second, Indonesia possesses the policy capital to strengthen cross-sectoral action through coordination mechanisms that already involve numerous ministries/agencies and have generated concrete actions; consequently, the replication of a “whole-of-government” approach may be more realistic if it is directed toward clear indicators (participation, IPO, facilities and infrastructure) and linked to existing DBON targets (Kemenpora, 2025). On the other hand, evidence of persistently low and variable public participation (around 30% historically and 26.3% in one strategic plan document) indicates that success cannot be achieved through a policy umbrella alone, but requires consistent delivery in regions and schools (Kemenko PMK, 2023).

Third, strengthening school sport can serve as a “leverage point” in Indonesia, given that the DBON designates school-based implementation as its starting point, while China mandates standards for daily physical activity time and policies opening school sports facilities to the public as part of mass fitness delivery (Kemenko PMK, 2023). The risk of uncritical emulation is the emergence of infrastructure- or mandate-driven policies lacking adequate monitoring systems and public health strategies, as reflected in criticism of the 2016–2020 National Fitness Plan for its absence of health targets/outcomes and of a multi-level surveillance system (Li et al., 2016).

Fourth, with regard to the sports industry, Indonesia has begun to develop instruments for managing blended financing through the LPDUK (sponsorship, broadcasting rights, promotion) and to measure the economic contribution of sport, whereas China more explicitly links mass fitness policy to industry value targets and to the integration of manufacturing, modern services, and tourism (Kemenpora, 2025). The practical implication is that Indonesia can accelerate its sports industry agenda while maintaining the goal of “cultivating a sporting culture” as a national priority, given that the cross-sectoral National Development Risk Management (MRPN) framework designates the cultivation of a sporting culture and sporting achievement as priority targets (IRMAPA, 2025).

SUGGESTION AND RECOMMENDATIONS (12-24 MONTHS)

The following recommendations focus on measures that can be implemented within 12–24 months by leveraging instruments already available in Indonesia and drawing adaptable

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inspiration from Chinese policy practices based on access targets and school programmes (Kemenko PMK, 2023).

1. **Close the gap in implementing regulations and clarify the mechanisms for regional DBON implementation.** Law No. 11/2022 mandates that implementing regulations be issued no later than two years after its entry into force; therefore, the completion of derivative regulations and regional implementation guidelines must be accelerated to ensure consistency with the DBON/DBOD/DOD (Republik Indonesia, 2022).
2. **Standardise a "minimum package of fitness services" based on 15-minute access, with local adaptation.** Indonesia could adopt the principle of "15-minute fitness circles" as a minimum service standard (rather than a uniform construction target), for example through mapping facility access, utilising green open spaces, and planning regional sports infrastructure (Zhou, 2025).
3. **Consolidate performance-based funding through the DAK and expand blended financing.** Coordination and oversight of DAK use for regional sports development have already been identified as a joint agenda of the Ministry of Home Affairs and the Ministry of Youth and Sports; this should therefore be linked to performance indicators (IPO/participation) and complemented by non-APBN financing channels through the LPDUK (sponsorship, broadcasting rights, promotion) (Kemenko PMK, 2023).
4. **Strengthen the school pathway as an engine for increasing participation.** Since the DBON states that implementation begins in schools and sets activity targets for the school-age population, updating the SKO curriculum and strengthening educational sport programmes should be prioritised and aligned with school indicator targets (Kemenko PMK, 2023).
5. **Gradually open and optimise school facilities for community use.** China explicitly encourages opening school sports facilities to the public and expanding campus venue systems; Indonesia could therefore design a similar scheme with clear operational protocols and maintenance financing at the regional level (State Council of the People's Republic of China, 2021).
6. **Strengthen a consistent monitoring system to avoid "policy without surveillance".** Academic criticism of the lack of surveillance in China's 2016–2020 fitness policy highlights the importance of a multi-level monitoring system; accordingly, Indonesia should reaffirm the use of the IPO as a measurement framework and align participation/access/human resource indicators across central and regional strategic plans (Li et al., 2016).

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7. **Synchronise the sports industry agenda with the cultivation of a sporting culture and the event economy.** Indonesia already measures the economic value of sport and has mandated the LPDUK to support events and the development of sports businesses; therefore, within 12–24 months the focus could be directed toward an event pipeline and sport–tourism partnerships, which are also emphasised in Chinese policy (Kemenpora, 2025).

CONCLUSION

The sports policy orientations of Indonesia and China exhibit substantial differences. Indonesia focuses on strengthening institutional governance and diversifying cross-sectoral financing, whereas China concentrates on developing sports infrastructure and expanding access to public services. A comparative analysis of these two approaches is crucial for revealing the role of sport as an instrument of multidimensional development, encompassing public health, international sporting achievement, and cultural diplomacy, and for providing a basis for formulating national policies that are more adaptive, collaborative, and competitive in both regional and global contexts.

FUTURE DIRECTIONS

This study relies on publicly available policy documents and secondary literature and does not measure soft power outcomes directly. Future research could examine how foreign audiences perceive the sports policies and sporting achievements of Indonesia and China, for instance through surveys, media analysis, or established soft power indices. Interviews with policymakers, national sports organisations, and regional governments would also help explain the gap between policy design and implementation identified in this study. Finally, extending the comparison to other Southeast Asian states would clarify whether Indonesia's challenges are country-specific or shared across the region.

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